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ABSTRACT 
The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left  
Outside a Merger * 
by Joseph Clougherty and Tomaso Duso 
It is commonly perceived that firms do not want to be outsiders to a merger 
between competitor firms. We instead argue that it is beneficial to be a non-
merging rival firm to a large horizontal merger. Using a sample of mergers with 
expert-identification of relevant rivals and the event-study methodology, we find 
rivals generally experience positive abnormal returns at the merger 
announcement date. Further, we find that the stock reaction of rivals to merger 
events is not sensitive to merger waves; hence, ‘future acquisition probability’ 
does not drive the positive abnormal returns of rivals. We then build a 
conceptual framework that encompasses the impact of merger events on both 
merging and rival firms in order to provide a schematic to elicit more information 
on merger type. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Die Wirkung von horizontalen Zusammenschlüssen auf Wettbewerber: 
Der Nutzen einer Außenseiterposition bei Fusionen 
Es ist gemeinhin bekannt, dass Unternehmen nicht Außenseiter einer Fusion 
zwischen eigenen Wettbewerbern sein wollen. In dieser Arbeit zeigen wir, dass 
es für Unternehmen durchaus vorteilhaft sein kann, sich an einem großen 
horizontalen Zusammenschluss nicht zu beteiligen. Anhand einer Datenbank 
von großen Fusionen, in denen die relevanten Wettbewerber der 
fusionierenden Unternehmen von Experten der Europäischen Kommission 
identifiziert worden sind, und Mithilfe einer Ereignisstudienmethode, bestätigen 
wir empirisch, dass Wettbewerber durchschnittlich positive abnormale Gewinne 
bei der Ankündigung eines Zusammenschlusses erzielen. Darüber hinaus 
stellen wir fest, dass die Reaktion der Aktienkurse von Konkurrenten bei der 
Ankündigung eines Zusammenschlusses nicht anfällig für Fusionswellen ist, 
und dass die abnormalen Gewinne nicht von der "künftigen 
Firmenübernahmewahrscheinlichkeit" getrieben sind. Schließlich wird in der 
Studie ein konzeptioneller Rahmen entwickelt, der die Auswirkungen der Fusion 
sowohl auf die fusionierenden Unternehmen und als auch auf die Wettbewerber 
zusammenfasst, um die Art des Zusammenschlusses besser identifizieren zu 
können. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Management scholarship has extensively studied a number of dimensions to merger and 
acquisition (M&A) activity: motives, relatedness, R&D expenditures, top-management turnover, 
acquirer and target stock returns, and more. With regard to acquirer and target stock returns, 
event studies find target firms to capture the majority – if not all – of the benefits from M&As 
(see Andrade et al., 2001; Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004; Sirower, 1997; and Weidenbaum 
and Vogt, 1987, for reviews of the extensive literature). Hence, the evidence clearly indicates 
that M&A activity does not equate to increasing an acquiring firm’s value: most deals simply 
pay the cost-of-capital (i.e., break-even) but, more worryingly, many deals actually destroy 
value. The sobering evidence regarding acquirer performance has led to a number of prescriptive 
statements by management scholars suggesting that executives approach the activity with 
extreme caution (e.g., Lubatkin et al., 1997; Lubatkin and Lane, 1996; Sirower, 1997). 
 While the above positive (acquisitions break-even at best and often destroy value) and 
normative (managers should approach mergers with caution) findings regarding acquiring firms 
are well-established, we have very few priors in management on what a merger represents for 
non-merging firms: i.e., the outsiders or rivals to a particular merger. First, the literature has not 
focused on what merger events mean to non-merging firms. Chatterjee’s (1986, 1992) early work 
represents the only management scholarship considering the impact of acquisitions on rivals. 
Second – and related to the above – we lack prescriptions regarding how rivals might best react 
to mergers. Only the field of competitive dynamics takes up the subject, but in a more general 
manner: where all competitive actions (price changes, entry/exits, product improvements, etc.) 
are considered alongside mergers for rival reactions (e.g., Chen and MacMillan, 1992; D’Aveni, 
1994). Moreover, Hoskisson et al. (1999) observe that the competitive dynamics literature 
assumes throughout that reacting in some fashion is optimal for rivals.  
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In the absence of any prescriptive studies regarding optimal strategy when ones 
competitors merge, firms appear to rely upon their competitive instincts by generally considering 
such events to be unwelcome; i.e., they assume hypercompetition is at play. Brito (2003, p. 
1614) states that “real world decisions illustrate that firms react to the announcement of mergers 
in their market, trying to prevent these from happening or trying to become insiders in a number 
of ways”. Akdogu (2003) provides some examples of this dynamic: Chevron Texaco announcing 
intent to bid for Conoco or Phillips to block the merger of the two companies; Norfolk Southern 
launching a hostile bid once it realised that its competitor, CSX, had agreed to a friendly 
acquisition of Conrail; Carnival attempting to dissolve a merger between its competitors (Royal 
Caribbean and P&O Princess).1 Hence, it is popularly perceived that being an outsider to a 
merger represents a competitive threat to non-merging firms (Akdogu, 2003; Brito, 2003; 
Molnar, 2007). Akdogu sums this observation up well when she states that there exists the 
“intuition that losing a target to a competitor is costly” (2003, p. 6).  
 We would like to contend the ‘received wisdom’ that the consummation of a merger 
between two firms represents a competitive threat to non-merging firms, and instead argue that 
rivals are more likely to experience gains when competitors merge. We identify two paths via 
which rival firms may benefit from a competitors’ merger: 1) the more mergers reduce 
competitive rivalry, the more pricing power for all firms – including rivals – in a market; 2) the 
more destructive the merger for insider firms, the more rival firms may actually gain – not lose – 
from the realisation of the merger. Accordingly, the main contention here is that non-merging 
firms are more likely to experience gains than losses when competitors merge: i.e., mergers that 
increase rival profitability tend to prevail. 
 In order to test our main contention, we employ data based on 165 large M&A 
transactions of a horizontal nature that both occurred within the 1990-2002 period and generated 
  
   
 
3
 
 
competitive implications in European product markets. We use the standard event study 
methodology to elicit the impact of merger events on acquirer, target and rival profitability. 
Thus, abnormal returns to stock prices around merger announcements are deemed to capture 
changes in the future profit stream of firms. The empirical tests support the contention that 
merger events generally result in positive gains (cumulative abnormal returns) to rival firms. Put 
more cautiously, merger events do not tend to represent a threat to rival firms. Furthermore, we 
find the abnormal returns of rival firms to be insensitive to the merger wave (suggesting that 
information effects in the form of ‘future acquisition probability’ do not drive the positive 
abnormal returns of rivals) and robust to heterogeneity in merger and rival characteristics. 
We draw from varied literatures (strategic management, strategy/industrial organization, 
finance, and organizational ecology) to support our aim of reversing the ‘received wisdom’ that 
being left outside a merger is necessarily a ‘bad’ thing. While drawing from such disparate 
literatures risks a lack of coherency in the conceptual backing, the advantage of an 
interdisciplinary approach resides in a comprehensive theoretical analysis from multiple 
perspectives. Furthermore, the invoking of different frameworks in our case is driven by the need 
to consider the relevant phenomenon in a logically consistent manner. First, the pre-existing 
literature on the impact of merger events on rival firms – which resides in the greater strategic 
management, strategy/industrial organization and finance fields – forms the basis of our main 
theoretical contention concerning the profitability of rival firms. Second, the finance literature 
(and recent work in management) on merger waves and information effects is imperative to 
theoretically explore whether the wave-like nature of merger events impacts rival firm value 
(i.e., whether rival gains are actually driven by competitive effects and not by information effects 
contained in merger waves). Third, the organizational ecology perspective – where trait variation 
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is appreciated – is essential to theoretically consider whether rival gains are robust to 
heterogeneity in merger and rival characteristics. 
  We accordingly structure the remainder of the paper as follows. First, we analyse the 
previous literature on the impact of merger events on rival firms to generate our main theoretical 
contention. Second, we consider whether the wave-like nature of merger events may impact 
rivals and generate the second theoretical contention. Third, we take into account whether 
heterogeneity in merger characteristics may impact rivals and generate a third theoretical 
contention. Fourth, we take into account whether heterogeneity in rival characteristics may 
impact rivals and generate a fourth set of theoretical contentions. Fifth, we describe the dataset 
of large horizontal mergers. Sixth, we outline the appropriate methodology. Seventh, we discuss 
the empirical results. Eighth, we discuss the limitations and implications of the research. Finally, 
we conclude. 
 
EFFECTS OF MERGERS ON RIVALS 
The extensive M&A literature has largely focused on how merger events affect acquirer 
and target firm performance, but has paid less heed to the impact of mergers on rival firms. Yet, 
a small and latent cross-disciplinary literature exists that analyses rival firm effects. Stigler 
(1950) first realised that it might be advantageous for firms to reside outside a merger, as rival 
firms can free-ride on the efforts made by merger insiders to reduce competition in a market: in 
this case, one can think of the merger as a sort of collective good to industry competitors. This 
free-riding effect was also manifest in the influential theoretical work by Salant et al. (1983) and 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985), where they respectively find under Cournot and Bertrand 
competition – the two ‘stock’ industrial organization (IO) models – that in most circumstances it 
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is more profitable to be an outsider than an insider to a merger. Furthermore, the management 
and IO literatures have identified two dynamics that conceivably generate benefits for rivals.   
First, a principal benefit of horizontal merger activity is the reduction of competition and 
facilitation of reduced rivalry (i.e., tacit collusion) amongst the remaining competitors (Porter, 
1985; Stigler, 1964). Here, the actions by merger insiders to increase prices and/or reduce output 
push up overall prices in a market; thus, merger transactions are beneficial to insiders (acquirers 
and targets) and outsiders (rivals) alike. In short, the interests of merging firms and rivals are 
entwined, as reduced competition leads to increased market power which in turn enhances the 
future profit expectations of rival firms. Note that the market-power elements concerning 
horizontal mergers have been deemed an important synergy source that is unique to related 
mergers and thus one of the reasons why unrelated mergers should under-perform when 
compared to related mergers (Chatterjee and Lubatkin, 1990; Lubatkin, 1983; Seth, 1990). 
Accordingly, the collusive or rivalry-reducing elements of horizontal merger activity yields 
higher profit opportunities that should generate positive abnormal returns for rivals. 
Second, the meta-analysis studies by Datta et al. (1992) and King et al. (2004) 
corroborate the observation by many M&A scholars (e.g., Lubatkin et al., 1997; Lubatkin and 
Lane, 1996; Sirower, 1997) that merger activity very often leads to failure for merging firms. 
Whether M&A performance is measured via short-term or long-term event windows while 
employing stock price data or whether accounting-based measures of profitability are employed, 
merging firms frequently do not deliver the intended synergies. In short, merging firms often 
experience value losses. While a number of explanations for the existence of such mergers have 
been posited (see Barkema and Schijven (2008) for a discussion on why acquisitions are often 
unsuccessful2), the point here is that unsuccessful mergers represent a competitive opportunity 
for non-merging rivals. If the merger does not involve the sufficient joining of resources and 
  
   
 
6
 
 
capabilities, then the merged firm has no advantage vis-à-vis rival firms. In particular, the 
substantial integration challenges of M&A activity (Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999; Larsson and Lubatkin, 2001; Vaara, 2003) may handicap the merged entity 
with respect to rival firms, as the rival firms will not be encumbered by substantial integration 
costs. In this vein, Chatterjee (1986, p. 122) notes that “the relative wealth gain/loss of the rival 
firms should be inversely related to that of the merging firms”. Accordingly, the value-
destroying nature of some mergers may create competitive opportunities for rival firms – 
opportunities that generate positive abnormal returns for rivals. 
In addition to the formative theoretical work on how rivals might gain from a 
competitor’s merger, a relatively more extensive finance-based literature exists that considers the 
impact of mergers on rivals using event studies of stock-market returns. Eckbo (1983) first 
considered the impact of merger events on non-merging firms, and found rival shareholders to 
earn above normal returns. Aside from Chatterjee’s (1986, 1992) studies, for a long time Eckbo’s 
approach to consider rival returns was usually employed as a secondary method for industry-
based studies with additional non-stock-based data (e.g., Hosken and Simpson, 2001; Singal, 
1996). Yet, a spate of recent literature – mostly, but not only, in finance – has re-embraced the 
approach to consider rival effects while taking a pan-industry perspective (Banerjee and Eckard, 
1998; Duso et al., 2007, Fee and Thomas, 2004; Molnar, 2007; Shahrur, 2005; Song and 
Walkling, 2000). Moreover, the above studies generally support rival firms benefiting from a 
merger event.  
In sum, both formative theoretical work and existing event studies support the idea that 
non-merging rival firms benefit from competitor mergers. It should be stressed, however, that the 
above represents more of a census than a sample of the literature considering rival firm effects. 
In light of the vast size of the literature in strategic management, strategy/industrial organization 
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and finance that focuses on merger performance, the sub-literature on rival firm effects cannot be 
considered extensive. Nevertheless, from the above foundations, we can generate a simple 
contention concerning large horizontal mergers that helps clarify our argument and motivate 
empirical testing: 
Hypothesis 1: Non-merging rival firms generally gain when competitor firms engage in 
mergers; i.e., rivals are more likely to gain – than to lose – from merger events. 
 
RIVAL EFFECTS AND MERGER WAVES 
In order to bring some empirical evidence to bear on the impact of mergers on rival 
profitability, we employ the stock-price event-study methodology. In doing so, we would like to 
interpret the stock reactions of rivals (and merging firms) as uniquely reflecting the merger’s 
competitive effects in the product market. Yet, both Eckbo (1983) and Chatterjee (1986) note 
that stock prices impound information effects as well as competitive effects. This early research 
treated information effects vaguely by not identifying what exactly is revealed by a merger 
event; instead, simply positing that mergers signal positive information about an industry’s 
value, and/or potential synergies between rivals and subsequent bidders. Kim and Singal note 
that Eckbo’s information effect has largely been interpreted as signals that “rival firms are now 
more likely to be takeover targets” (1993: 551). Accordingly, more recent scholarship (e.g., 
Molnar, 2007; Song and Walkling, 2000) has concentrated on how mergers can convey whether 
rivals are more or less likely to be targets – a lucrative event for shareholders – in the future.  
Researchers have also recently come to better appreciate Gort’s (1969) observation that 
mergers come in waves. In particular, the field of finance has made efforts to understand merger 
activity as manifesting within a wave-like context, as a number of recent studies (e.g., Andrade 
and Stafford, 2004; Akdogu et al., 2005; Bernile et al., 2006; ) have attempted to uncover the 
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properties that drive merger waves. Yet, the idea to consider merger activity in its proper wave-
like context has begun to spread beyond finance. For instance, the McNamara et al. (2008) study 
examines how merger waves impact acquiring firm value. 
It stands to reason then that a merger’s information effect with respect to ‘future 
acquisition probability’ will be moderated by where on the wave the event takes place. Mergers 
occurring in the pre-crest period (from trough to crest) conceivably indicate a higher probability 
of future acquisition for rivals (i.e., a larger information effect) than do mergers occurring in the 
post-crest period (from crest to trough). This is due to the increased merger activity levels 
associated with the pre-crest period enhancing the probability of rivals being a future target, 
while the lowered merger activity levels characteristic of the post-crest period reduce the 
probability of rivals being a future target. In support of such conjecture, Floegel et al. (2005) 
present evidence that rivals’ pre-crest abnormal returns are positive (0.31%) and post-crest 
abnormal returns are negative (-0.12%) on average; but also find acquirers’ abnormal returns to 
be far more sensitive to the wave (1.55% and -1.11% in the respective pre-crest and post-crest 
periods). Furthermore, other scholars (e.g., Jarrell and Bradley, 1980; Song and Walkling, 2000) 
focus on merger announcements that are early in the pre-crest period as involving the greatest 
information effect. In this vein, Chatterjee (1992: 270) states that when “the rivals can also 
benefit from [a] similar combination then the takeover offer by the first bidder may lead to a 
merger wave”. 
In sum, future acquisition probability has been deemed in the pre-existing literature to 
enhance the abnormal returns of rival firms, and this information effect has been posited to vary 
over the merger wave. Accordingly, from the theoretical foundations outlined above, we can 
generate a simple contention concerning large horizontal mergers that helps clarify the argument 
and motivate our empirical testing: 
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Hypothesis 2: The profitability of rival firms is sensitive to merger waves; i.e., the merger 
wave affects the abnormal returns of rival firms. 
Note, that in order to be confident that any positive abnormal returns for rivals in our sample are 
largely driven by competitive effects, the empirical results should be robust over the length of 
the merger wave. In other words, rival returns should actually be insensitive to any wave-like 
trends in merger behaviour. Hence, evidence rejecting the second hypothesis will allow stronger 
inferences with regard to the dynamics behind the first hypothesis. 
 
HETEROGENEITY IN MERGER CHARACTERISTICS 
The above hypotheses are appropriate for exploring average tendencies in non-merging 
rival firm profitability; yet without doubt, there exists a significant amount of heterogeneity in 
merger characteristics (e.g., Gugler et al., 2003). Accordingly, it behoves us to consider variation 
in the geographic and product-space nature of merger transactions in order to better identify the 
source of merger tendencies and in order to elicit confident inferences on the generalisability of 
rival firm profitability. In other words, we must consider whether any positive abnormal return 
elicited for rival firms might break down over the sizable heterogeneity manifested in merger 
transactions. 
In terms of geographic heterogeneity, Gugler et al. (2003) find some evidence that merger 
activity varies in the cross-national context. In particular, the impact of mergers on the sales of 
merging firms varies significantly across nations. This dynamic suggests that mergers in one 
specific context (e.g., inside Europe) might differ from mergers in other geographic contexts 
(e.g., outside Europe). Furthermore, it stands to reason that cross-border mergers might exhibit 
less market-power elements (which are beneficial to rival firms), as the number of competitors in 
a market often remains stable with these types of mergers since the foreign acquirer uses the 
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merger as a means to enter the local market for the first time. Put simply, in a cross-border 
merger a local competitor is often replaced by a foreign competitor, thus the number of 
competitors does not change. Hence, the rivals of cross-border mergers – and the rivals of 
mergers from different geographic contexts – might be less likely to gain (and more likely to 
lose) from the merger of competitor firms.   
In terms of product-market heterogeneity, Gugler et al. (2003) find strong evidence in 
support of merger activity varying across industries. In particular, mergers in the manufacturing 
sector tend to be less profitable than mergers in the service sector. Andrade and Stafford’s (2004) 
insight that mergers help both expand (when capacity is tight) and contract (when capacity is in 
excess) an industry helps shed light on the finding that manufacturing mergers exhibit less 
profitability. Manufacturing industries in developed nations have faced substantial challenges 
over the last three decades due to rising import competition and other factors; hence, they 
certainly represent declining industries where capacity must be reduced. Further, Molnar (2007) 
points out that a merger announcement can convey the information that an industry is in a 
declining state, thus decreasing the abnormal returns of both merger insiders and outsiders. 
Hence, the rivals of manufacturing mergers might be less likely to gain (and more likely to lose) 
from the merger of competitor firms than would the rivals of service industry mergers. 
In sum, substantial heterogeneity exists in the characteristics of merger activity – 
heterogeneity that may lead to some classes of mergers manifesting a general negative impact on 
rival firms. In particular, rival firm profitability might be negative for cross-border and 
manufacturing mergers. Accordingly, from the foundations outlined above, we can generate a 
simple contention concerning large horizontal mergers that helps clarify the argument and 
motivate our empirical testing: 
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Hypothesis 3: The profitability of rival firms is sensitive to the heterogeneity of merger 
characteristics; i.e., the abnormal returns of rival firms are negative in some geographic 
and product market contexts for merger activity. 
 
HETEROGENEITY IN RIVAL CHARACTERISTICS 
In addition to the above heterogeneity in merger characteristics, heterogeneity in rival 
firm characteristics also exists. Organizational ecologists, for instance, have considered the 
ability of rivals to differ over a number of different dimensions. This heterogeneity may then 
translate into some types of rivals manifesting negative profitability (i.e., negative abnormal 
returns) in response to merger activity by competitor firms. In this vein, Winter (1990: 286) 
notes that intra-population variance exists in “that some members of the organizational 
populations under study may simply be better than others”. Accordingly, it also behoves us to 
consider variation in rival types in order to elicit confident inferences on the generalisability of 
rival firms gaining from merger activity. Thus, we will focus here on the ability of rivals to differ 
over three dimensions: size, population density, and proximity. 
First, organizational ecologists (e.g., Hannan and Freeman, 1984) expect large firms to be 
less vulnerable to competitive pressures, as large organisations are less subject to the risk of 
failure. Furthermore, small firms entail a liability of smallness, as they find it more difficult to 
raise capital, recruit skilled staff, and comply with government regulations (Baum and Shipilov, 
2006). Hence, absolutely-small rivals might be less likely to gain (and more likely to lose) from 
the merger of competitor firms than would absolutely-large rivals. Yet, Baum and Korn (1996: 
259-260) note that “firms of similar sizes compete more intensely (have larger negative 
influences on each other’s growth and survival) because they use similar strategies and thus 
depend on similar mixes of resources”. Accordingly, the actions of similar size competitors 
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represent a greater negative threat to a focal firm than do the actions of competitors with a 
different size – a relative size argument as opposed to the previous absolute size argument. 
Hence, rivals that are relatively similar in size to the acquiring firm in a transaction might be less 
likely to gain (and more likely to lose) from the merger than would rivals that are relatively 
smaller or relatively larger to the acquiring firm. In sum, rival profitability might be negative 
when rival firms are absolutely small or when rival firms are relatively similar in size to the 
acquiring firm. Accordingly, from the foundations outlined above, we can generate a simple 
contention concerning large horizontal mergers that helps clarify the argument and motivate our 
empirical testing: 
Hypothesis 4a: The profitability of rival firms is sensitive to heterogeneity in rival size 
characteristics; i.e., the abnormal returns of rival firms are negative when rivals are 
absolutely small and relatively similar to acquiring firms. 
 
Second, ecological models – as well as strategic and economic models – hold that more 
firms in a population mean greater competition for scarce resources and thus higher failure rates 
(Aldrich, 1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Porter, 1980; Baum and Korn, 1996). Accordingly, 
an increased population density leads to heightened competition and greater losses for firms 
competing in an environment. This dynamic can also be grounded in our present context when 
one considers that the market-power effects of a merger transaction (which are beneficial for 
rivals) are likely to be greatest when few competitors are in a market (Tirole, 1988). Hence, 
when many rivals (i.e., competitors) exist for a particular merger transaction, then a particular 
rival would be less likely to gain (and more likely to lose) from the merger than would be the 
case if there were few rivals for the merger. In sum, rival firm profitability might be negative 
when rivals are situated in a densely populated environment with many competitors. Accordingly 
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from the foundations outlined above, we can generate a simple contention concerning large 
horizontal mergers that helps clarify the argument and motivate our empirical testing: 
Hypothesis 4b: The profitability of rival firms is sensitive to heterogeneity in population 
density characteristics; i.e., the abnormal returns of rival firms are negative when they 
compete in densely populated environments with many competitors.  
 
Third, beginning with Zucker (1989) cognitive-based studies of rivalry have explored the 
role of geographic space with local competitors involving more intense rivalry than far-away 
competitors. Boari et al. (2006) note that this is due to managers tending to identify nearby – as 
opposed to far-away – competitors as rivals; thus, proximity seems to matter. Hence, whether 
rivals hail from the same – or a different – region as compared to the merging firms may impact 
rivals. In particular, same-region rivals might be less likely to gain (and more likely to lose) from 
the merger than would be the case if the rival hailed from a different region to that of the 
merging firms. In sum, rival firm profitability might be negative when rivals are based in the 
same region as merging firms. Accordingly, from the foundations outlined above, we can 
generate a simple contention concerning large horizontal mergers that helps clarify the argument 
and motivate our empirical testing: 
Hypothesis 4c: The profitability of rival firms is sensitive to heterogeneity in rival 
proximity characteristics; i.e., the abnormal returns of rival firms are negative when they 
hail from the same region as the merging firms.  
 
DATA 
In order to gather empirical evidence on the general impact of mergers on acquirer, target 
and rival firms, we require a sample of merger events. Our sample derives from 165 large M&A 
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transactions of a horizontal nature that both occurred within the 1990-2002 period and affected 
European product markets. See Appendix A for details on the mergers that make up the sample. 
From these transactions, we were able to identify and obtain the relevant usable data for 134 
acquirers, 142 targets, and 577 rivals (clearly, many mergers involved multiple rivals) for a total 
of 853 firm-level observations around merger events. Furthermore, several firms were involved 
in more than one merger event (e.g., an acquirer in one merger, but a rival in another) as 
reflected by our having 544 total firms in the sample. Note that we cleaned the data of any firms 
experiencing multiple merger events (as acquirer, target or rival) around the same period—i.e., 
those observations were dropped. Two properties of the sample stand out: it consists of large 
horizontal transactions, and the observed M&As involve significant European implications. Both 
properties are due to these mergers being drawn from those transactions automatically analysed 
by the European Commission for antitrust implications.3 
First, European Union (EU) merger regulations mandate notification when the combined 
aggregate worldwide turnover of the merging parties exceeds five billion Euros or when the 
combined aggregate EU-wide turnover of the merging parties exceeds 250 million Euros. 
Therefore, all of these M&As have undergone a mandatory investigation by the European 
Commission (EC)—an investigation automatically triggered because the merger size exceeded 
the notification thresholds. In short, our sample represents the big horizontal transactions: the 
ones that make business press headlines, incur the interest of pundits and industry analysts, and 
inevitably require at least a cursory review by government officials. 
Second, drawing merger observations from those transactions analysed by the EC clearly 
leads to European firms being well-represented in the sample. Yet Clougherty (2005) noted that 
managers are uncertain over the source (home-nation or foreign-nation) of antitrust holdup for 
domestic mergers. Accordingly, EU antitrust officials vet many different types of mergers with 
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firms originating from both EU and non-EU nations. Our sample also reflects this diversity as 
sixty percent of the firms are listed in European nations, twenty-five percent are listed in either 
the US or Canada, and fifteen percent – including 5.5% for Japan – come from the rest of the 
world. In short, our sample is weighted toward European mergers but is also representative of the 
global environment for M&As since many selected mergers involved non-European firms 
making acquisitions that significantly impact world markets. 
The great advantage in drawing our merger database from those transactions analysed by 
EC officials is that Commission experts have made a careful market definition. The first order of 
business for any antitrust review is defining the merger’s relevant market in terms of product and 
geographical space and identifying the relevant competitors. Hence, the EC files yield an 
accurate assessment of rival identity. The expert assessment of rival identity is a novelty and a 
particular strength of this merger sample. The pre-existing finance literature on rival effects (e.g., 
Song and Walkling, 2000; Fee and Thomas, 2004) customarily defines rivals as consisting of all 
firms in the same industry classification. While some firms in the same industry will certainly be 
rivals, other firms are likely to be customers and/or suppliers to the merging firms, and still 
others may have no relation to merging parties. To the degree that a rival sample is composed of 
firms with no-relation to merging firms, empirical results would be biased towards finding zero 
abnormal returns for rivals because such firms would be unaffected by the merger. Even more 
troubling would be considering customer firms to be rivals; for example, synergistic mergers 
should lead to lower profits for rivals but higher profits for customers due to lower prices, thus 
including customer-firms along with rival-firms would bias the abnormal-return results upward. 
Inappropriately considering supplier firms to be rivals would also bias results. Since sharing the 
same industry does not equate to being real competitors in a product market, the expert 
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assessment of rival-identity allows us to assess the effect of mergers on rivals much more 
precisely than previous work. 
To complement the data from the EC files, we determined the first day each merger case 
appeared in the international press. This announcement date was found by using ‘Dow Jones 
Interactive’: a customisable business news and research product that integrates content from 
newspapers, newswires, journals, research reports, and web sites. Furthermore, stock market data 
for the period around the announcement date was obtained from ‘Datastream’.  In particular, we 
collected daily data on the stock returns (Ri,t) and market values (MVit) for all merging and rival 
firms; and we collected information about a market return (Rm,t) for each firms’ industry sector 
(where i refers to the firm, m to the specific sector, and t to time). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
We use an event-study methodology to measure the impact of mergers on acquirer, target 
and rival firms’ profitability. The observed stock return for a firm at time t ( tiR , ) – which 
represents the discounted future value of the firm at this point in time – is compared to a 
hypothetical counterfactual for the scenario where the merger would not have been announced. 
We use the market model to calculate the counterfactual: under the assumptions of efficient 
markets and rational expectations, the market model predicts that firm i’s stock return at time t 
( tiR , ) is proportional to a market return ( tmR , ): 
titmiiti RR ,,, εβα ++=        
and ti,ε is an i.i.d. normally distributed error term. To study the stock price reaction to a merger 
announcement, we first estimate the ‘normal return’ for each firm by estimating the previous 
equation over a 240-day trading period (ending 60 days prior to the announcement date) using 
the Scholes-Williams (1977) method. We obtain estimated values for the model’s parameters α 
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and β, which then predict firm i’s stock price for the counterfactual scenario; i.e., we estimate a 
stock price for the event where the merger would not have been announced ( tiR ,ˆ ). We then 
calculate the abnormal return around the mergers’ announcement day t (ARi,t) as follows: 
( )tmiiitititti RRRRAR ,, ˆˆˆ βα +−=−= . 
Since there might be information leakages – which influence firm i’s return before (or after) the 
merger announcement – we define the total firm valuation effect of the merger (the cumulative 
abnormal return or CAR) as being the sum of the daily abnormal returns within an event window 
spanning from τ1 days before the event to τ2 days after the event: 
∑
=
= 2
1
21 ,,,
τ
τ
ττ
t
tii ARCAR  
We calculate these measures for all merging firms (acquirer and target) and rivals.  
 In our methodological set-up, we were conscious of the recommendations given by 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) for employing event studies in management research. First, as 
already mentioned, we clean the data of any observations with confounding merger events near 
the event window; plus, the large mergers from this sample likely dwarf the impact of any 
smaller events. Second, it bears stressing that we have a relatively big sample – none of the 29 
management event studies surveyed by McWilliams and Siegel employed more than our 853 
observations – thus the outlier (which we checked for) and robustness-of-significance problems 
are mitigated. Third, we take a conservative approach to ensure that other events are not driving 
abnormal returns by focusing on a short 3-day window (-1, 1), despite it standing to reason that a 
relatively longer window would allow rival effects to be more fully impounded in stock prices. 
For example, both Song and Walkling (2000) and Shahrur (2005) find the CARs of rival firms to 
significantly increase when the event window increases to eleven days (-5, 5). Accordingly, we 
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will also employ the 11-day window in our reported estimations to ensure robustness of the 3-
day results and allow capturing full rival effects. 
 Note that our main empirical contention – (H1) rivals generally gain from a merger event 
– does not necessarily attempt to define the source of rival gains. Nevertheless, we can use 
multivariate regression analysis to test this assertion. First, we construct simple dummy variables 
capturing whether a firm is a target (T), acquirer (A) or rival (R) respectively; thus, allowing the 
testing of whether the CARs of the three firm types are positive on average and statistically 
significant. Accordingly, our baseline regression model (regression specification 1) takes the 
following form: 
iiiii RbAbT bCAR   ε+++= 321     (1) 
where i indexes the 853 firm-level observations, and εi represents an error term. Because targets, 
acquirers and rivals from a given merger all react to the same event, we need to correct for the 
potential intra-merger correlation among observations. We therefore cluster the standard errors at 
the merger level. We also use a Hubert-White estimator for robust standard errors to account for 
potential heteroskedasticity in the error term. Notice that, because we estimate equation (1) 
without a constant term, the b-coefficients represent the average CAR for each firm-type, while 
the error term captures the deviations from these means. 
Second, to test the relevance of the second empirical contention – (H2) rival firm gains 
are sensitive to merger waves – we construct an individual time trend for targets, acquirers and 
rivals by interacting the three firm-identity variables (T, A & R) with a relatively fine trend 
variable: the number given to the merger event by the EC. Beginning with merger number 1 in 
1990, each subsequent merger notification received a progressively increasing identification 
number (the EC merger numbers for our sample mergers are reported in Appendix A). Hence, 
for a given merger, its identification number represents the cumulative number of mergers 
  
   
 
19
 
 
notified until that point in time. This variable should well represent the merger wave, as the 
number of notifications increased more than proportionally over time during the sample period 
reflecting the increased merger activity taking place in the 1990s. Employing this trend measure 
represents an improvement over using an annual trend (where a merger in January is considered 
trend-identical to a merger in December), as it allows a more fine-grained representation of the 
merger wave. Moreover, introducing these individual trend variables allows detecting whether 
the merger wave differently affects the abnormal stock returns of our three firm types; i.e., 
whether target, acquirer and rival CARs around a merger event are significantly, and differently, 
affected by where the event takes place along the merger wave. The second model (regression 
specification 2) that we run is therefore: 
iiiiiiii trendRctrendActrendTcRbAbT bCAR     ε+−+−+−+++= 321321  
Adding the trend variable does, however, make the interpretation of the b-coefficients 
less obvious. They now measure the average effect for that particular firm-type when the trend is 
equal to zero, i.e. the average effect for the very first merger in the wave (e.g., a hypothetical 
merger 0). Yet, the c-coefficients for the firm-type-specific trends (T-trend, A-trend, R-trend) 
represent the average increase due to time elapsing. As our sample period roughly corresponds to 
the entire pre-crest period of a merger wave, a positive and significant trend coefficient would 
indicate that CARs are wave sensitive. Concerning the overall firm-specific average effects, 
these can now be recovered by calculating the sum between the two coefficients evaluated at the 
mean value of the trend (e.g., for the target: trendTcb −+ *11 ).  
The above methods are appropriate for detecting average tendencies in our sample; yet as 
captured in the reasoning behind hypothesis 3, the cross-national and cross-industry 
environments exhibit a significant amount of heterogeneity in merger activity that may impact 
our results. Accordingly in additional regression models, we break down regression specification 
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1 by the geographic and product-space nature of the transaction to better identify the source of 
merger tendencies. In particular, we consider mergers where the acquirer and target both hail 
from Europe (Intra-European mergers), where the acquirer and target both hail from outside 
Europe (Extra-European mergers), and where only the acquirer or the target hails from Europe 
and the other merging firm comes from outside Europe (Cross-Euro-Border mergers). 
Furthermore, we have observations on mergers from the manufacturing and service industries; 
hence we also break down merger activity into manufacturing-mergers and service-mergers. 
Accordingly, regression specifications’ 3 and 4 respectively consider the geographic and 
product-space heterogeneity for merger transactions in our sample and allow jointly testing 
hypothesis 3. 
In addition to potential heterogeneity in merger transactions, hypothesis 4a, 4b and 4c 
were founded on the importance of rival heterogeneity over three dimensions: size, population 
density, and proximity. Regarding size, regression specification 5 breaks down regression 
specification 1 by absolute rival size: Large-Rivals representing the top 50% of the size 
distribution of rivals in terms of market value for a given merger; Small-Rivals representing the 
bottom 50% of the same distribution. Further, regression specification 6 breaks down regression 
specification 1 by the relative size of the rivals with respect to the acquiring firms: Relatively-
Small-Rivals representing those rivals that have a market-value less than half that of the 
acquirer; Relatively-Large-Rivals representing those rivals that have a market-value greater than 
150% of the acquirer; Relatively-Similar-Rivals representing those rivals of a size in between the 
above two categories. Second regarding population density, regression specification 7 breaks 
down regression specification 1 by the number of rivals for the merger transaction: Many-Rivals 
representing when the merger transaction has more rivals than the median number of rivals for 
our sample (equal to seven rivals); Few-Rivals representing when the merger transaction has 
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fewer rivals than the median number of rivals for our sample. Third regarding the proximity of 
rivals relative to merging firms, regression specification 8 breaks down regression specification 
1 by whether the rivals hail from the same region (Europe, Asia, and North America) as the 
merging firms: Same-Region-Rival representing when the rival comes from the same region as 
either the acquirer or the target; Different-Region-Rival representing when the rival comes from 
a different region to that of both the acquirer and the target. Accordingly, regression 
specifications’ 5, 6, 7 and 8 consider rival firm heterogeneity with regard to absolute size, 
relative size, population density and proximity in the merger transactions from our sample, and 
collectively allow testing hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c. 
 
RESULTS 
Table I reports the results for regression specifications’ 1 and 2 that respectively test the 
first two hypotheses. The results from regression specification 1 are very much in line with the 
established empirical literature on merging firm performance: acquirers have very small positive 
CARs on average that are not significantly different from zero; and targets on average have 
positive and significant CARs of 3.6% with the 3-day window and 4.2% with the 11-day 
window. Of particular interest are the CARs for rival firms which are also positive and 
statistically significant (0.37% for the 3-day and 0.90% for the 11-day window); hence, rivals 
tend to win in our sample. Notice also that rivals consistently perform better than acquirers but 
worse than targets. Hence, it is still best to be a target (in line with the previous empirical 
literature), but it is certainly better to be a rival than an acquirer. In short, the results support 
hypothesis 1 and indicate that, on average, rivals experience positive abnormal returns; put more 
cautiously, by no means does a penalty appear to generally exist for being left outside a merger. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
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Insert Table I about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Regression specification 2 (concerning H2) presents the empirical results from a model 
that allows the abnormal returns for the three different firm types (target, acquirer and rival) to 
individually vary over the merger wave. Recall that coefficient estimates for the firm-identity 
variables now have a fundamentally different meaning, as they represent the abnormal returns 
for the first merger in the wave. However, the acquirer-trend, target-trend and rival-trend 
variables provide evidence as to whether merger waves impact CARs. We see that the CARs of 
both rivals and acquirers do not appear to be affected by the merger wave: i.e., their abnormal 
returns do not significantly vary over the merger wave. Yet, the abnormal returns of targets vary 
significantly over the merger wave: the CARs of target firms being positively influenced by the 
merger wave. Furthermore, we can recover from the regression specification the average CARs 
for the three types of firms: with rivals on average exhibiting significant abnormal returns of 
0.37% with a 3-day and 0.90% with an 11-day window; targets on average exhibiting significant 
abnormal returns of 3.7% with a 3-day and 4.2% with an 11-day window; and acquirers 
exhibiting slightly positive but insignificant abnormal returns. Accordingly, the empirical results 
from regression specification 2 reject hypothesis 2; thus, suggesting that the generally positive 
effects for rivals are not simply driven by the information effects of the merger event. In 
particular, if the rival effects were driven by the merger event signalling a higher ‘future 
acquisition probability’, then rival abnormal returns would be sensitive to the merger wave. 
Hence, the insensitivity of rival firm stock prices to the merger wave suggests that we can 
interpret the positive abnormal returns of rivals in our sample as being largely driven by 
competitive effects. 
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Table II reports the results for regression specifications’ 3 and 4 which jointly test the 
third hypothesis – (H3) rival firm gains are sensitive to heterogeneity in merger characteristics. 
In particular, regression specification 3 breaks down the three firm types (target, acquirer, and 
rival) into three different geographic contexts under which mergers may fall: Intra-European, 
Extra-European, and Cross-Euro-Border. In terms of the positive abnormal returns to targets 
detected in the first two regressions, this effect seems to be statistically robust across the 
different geographic contexts for mergers: targets in intra-European mergers on average exhibit 
significant CARs of 3.0% with a 3-day and 3.1% with an 11-day window; targets in extra-
European mergers on average exhibit significant CARs of 8.1% with a 3-day and 8.8% with an 
11-day window; and targets in cross-euro-border mergers exhibit significant CARs of 2.1% and 
3.7% respectively. In terms of the non-significant effect found for acquiring firms in the first two 
regression specifications, this effect is also manifest across the different geographical contexts 
for mergers – with the exception of acquirers for Extra-European mergers manifesting a 
statistically significant negative CAR for the 11-day window. In terms of the positive abnormal 
returns to rivals detected in the first two regressions, this effect is statistically robust in two 
geographic contexts: rivals in Intra-European mergers on average exhibit significant CARs of 
0.34% in the 3-day and 0.91% in the 11-day window; and rivals in Extra-European mergers 
exhibit significant CARs of 0.81% and 0.75% respectively. However, the rivals in cross-euro-
border mergers exhibit positive but insignificant CARs on average for both windows; thus, 
conforming to the idea that cross-border mergers involve less market-power elements, though it 
is important to stress that the average abnormal return is still positive with these merger types. 
Accordingly, Intra-European mergers result in positive rival effects, Cross-Euro-Border mergers 
do not significantly affect rivals, and Extra-European mergers generate substantial rival gains. 
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Most importantly, we do not find evidence of negative abnormal returns for rival firms in any 
geographic context, thus rejecting the geographic heterogeneity elements of hypothesis 3. 
Regression specification 4 breaks down the three firm types (target, acquirer, and rival) 
into the different product contexts under which mergers may fall: manufacturing and service 
industry mergers. In terms of the positive abnormal returns to targets detected in the first two 
regressions, this effect seems to be statistically robust across the different product-market 
contexts for mergers: targets in manufacturing mergers on average exhibit significant CARs of 
3.4% with a 3-day and 4.2% with an 11-day window; and targets in service-industry mergers 
exhibit significant CARs of 4.0% for both event windows. In terms of the general non-significant 
effect found for acquiring firms in regression specifications’ 1 and 2, this non-effect is also 
consistent across the different product-market contexts for mergers as it is insignificant in both 
sectors for both event windows. In terms of the positive abnormal returns for rivals detected in 
regression specifications’ 1 and 2, this effect is statistically robust over both event windows for 
service-industry mergers: where rivals on average exhibit significant abnormal returns of 0.7% 
for the 3-day and 1.7% for the 11-day window. The abnormal return for rivals is also positive 
over both windows for manufacturing mergers (0.22% for the 3-day and 1.22% for the 11-day 
window), but is only statistically significant with the 11-day window. Moreover, we again do not 
find any evidence of negative abnormal returns for rivals in either of the two product market 
contexts for merger activity, thus rejecting the product market heterogeneity elements of 
hypothesis 3. 
Table III reports the results for regression specifications’ 5 and 6 which jointly test 
hypothesis 4a. To allow concentration on rival heterogeneity effects and for purposes of brevity, 
we note that in both specifications and both event windows the coefficient estimates for targets 
and acquirers are consistent with those reported in regression specification 1.  
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Regression specification 5 suggests that both absolutely large and absolutely small rivals 
gain from merger events, as the coefficient estimates are positive and generally significant for 
both event windows. It should be pointed out that the small-rival coefficient estimate – when 
employing the 3-day window – does not indicate formal significance; yet its p-value is actually 
0.11, thus indicating marginal significance. Further, an additional t-test of the difference between 
the coefficient estimates for small and large rivals clearly cannot reject the null-hypothesis that 
the CARs of large rivals are equal to the CARs of small rivals (p-value of 0.770 for the tests on 
the 3-day window and 0.419 for the tests on the 11-day window coefficient estimates). Hence, 
the empirical evidence does not suggest that absolutely small rivals are harmed by merger events 
(counter to hypothesis 4a); if anything, the evidence suggests that absolutely small rivals gain 
more than large rivals. 
Regression specification 6 moves beyond absolute size to consider the relative size of 
rivals with respect to acquiring firms; here, both relatively small (0.61% for the 3-day and 1.2% 
for the 11-day CAR) and relatively similar (0.74% for the 3-day and 1.5% for the 11-day CAR) 
rivals tend to gain equally when competitors engage in mergers. However, rivals that are 
relatively larger than the acquiring firm tend to have a small – but insignificant – positive CAR. 
This result is somewhat surprising as organizational ecologists tend to think that relatively large 
firms are more immune to threats from the competitive environment; yet our evidence suggests 
that relatively large firms are also more immune to the opportunities (like the merger of a 
competitor) provided in the competitive environment. Further, we find no evidence that 
relatively similar rivals experience negative effects; in fact – if anything – they experience the 
largest CARs. Accordingly, we do not find any evidence in regression specification 5 and 6 of 
negative abnormal returns for rivals in any size (absolute and relative) context, thus rejecting the 
contentions embedded in hypothesis 4a. 
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Table IV reports the results for regression specifications’ 7 and 8 – which respectively 
test the impact of population density heterogeneity (H4b) and rival proximity heterogeneity 
(H4c) – on our sample of large horizontal mergers. We again suppress discussion of the 
coefficient estimates for targets and acquirers as they are also consistent with previous regression 
models. 
Regression specification 7 suggests no difference whatsoever for rival CARs when one 
compares a context of high population density (many rivals) with a context of low population 
density (few rivals). The coefficient estimates for many-rivals and few-rivals are consistently 
positive for both event windows: a 0.36% (1.08%) average CAR for the many rivals category 
and a 0.38% (0.72%) average CAR for the few rivals category when using the 3-day (11-day) 
window. While statistical significance is only manifest for few-rivals when a 3-day window is 
employed and for many-rivals when an 11-day window is employed, we can again do a t-test of 
the difference between the coefficient estimates for many and few rivals. These tests suggest no 
significant difference between rivals in a high density context (many rivals) as compared to 
rivals in a low density context (few rivals): p-values of 0.358 for the 3-day and 0.448 for the 11-
day window. Hence, the empirical evidence does not suggest that rivals in a high density 
environment are harmed by merger events (counter to hypothesis 4b); if anything, the evidence 
suggests that rivals in high density environments gain a bit more than do rivals in a low density 
environment. 
Regression specification 8 suggests that positive and statistically significant CARs hold 
for both when rivals hail – and don’t hail – from the same region as one of the merging firms. 
Employing the familiar 3-day (11-day) event window: same-region-rivals indicate a 0.38% 
(0.74%) average CAR, and different-region-rivals indicate a 0.50% (1.3%) average CAR. Hence, 
this finding – that rivals from other regions gain a bit more than rivals from inside the region of 
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the merger – is partly in line with the received wisdom in organizational ecology that nearby 
competitors represent greater threats; yet akin to the previous results, we should stress that 
nearby competitors still very much gain from the merger event. Accordingly, the evidence in 
regression specifications’ 7 and 8 suggests no contexts (regarding population density or rival 
proximity) where rival abnormal returns are negative, thus respectively rejecting hypothesis 4b 
and 4c. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Insert Table II about here 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
In sum, the eight regression specifications provide a good amount of evidence in support 
of rival firms generally benefiting from merger events. Regression specification 1 suggests that 
rivals gain on average from merger events; these gains are not as large as targets, but they are 
significantly different from zero. Hence, the empirical evidence supports the first hypothesis. 
Regression specification 2 suggests that rival CARs are not influenced by the merger wave, as 
positive rival CARs do not appear to be a function of a higher ‘future acquisition probability’. 
Hence, the evidence rejects the second hypothesis and allows stronger inferences with regard to 
the competitive effects – not information effects – driving the positive CARs of rivals. 
Regression specification 3 finds that rival CARs are positive across the three different 
geographical contexts for merger activity, though insignificant for cross-euro-border mergers. 
Regression specification 4 finds that rivals CARs are positive for manufacturing and service 
industries. Hence, regression specifications’ 3 and 4 collectively reject the third hypothesis 
regarding rival gains breaking down under heterogeneity in merger transactions.  
Furthermore, regression specification 5 through 8 also support that rivals generally 
benefit from merger events, as the positive CAR for rival firms appears to hold up when we 
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consider absolute size differences in rivals (regression specification 5), relative size differences 
in rivals (regression specification 6), the population density in the environment (regression 
specification 7), and the proximity of rivals to merging firms (regression specification 8). It 
should be stressed that in none of the heterogeneous contexts for rivals (regression specifications 
5 – 8) do we find rival effects to be negative on average; hence, the evidence collectively rejects 
hypotheses 4a, 4b and 4c. Yet, the fact that these positive rival effects are significant only in the 
majority – so not all – contexts for merger transactions suggests that we temper our 
interpretations and state that the evidence weakly supports that rival firms generally gain from 
merger events. Moreover, our evidence certainly strongly rejects the idea that merger events 
generally represent a threat to non-merging rival firms.  
 
LIMITATIONS, FUTURE RESEARCH AND MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS 
This research involves a number of limitations that should be acknowledged: a sample 
where small horizontal mergers are under-represented; an inability to consider managerial 
cognitions regarding a merger event; and a lack of consideration for the drivers of rival 
profitability (though we do consider the conditions supporting rival abnormal returns). These 
limitations – as well as some strengths of the manuscript – potentially point to future avenues of 
management research. Beyond the potential for future management research, the empirical 
results yield very clear prescriptions for managerial practice regarding M&A activity. 
First, the most obvious area for additional research resides in the realm of further 
empirical testing on different M&A samples. While our sample is particularly strong regarding 
the accuracy of rival-identity, it is also characterised by large horizontal transactions. Hence, 
samples that involve relatively smaller horizontal mergers may involve different properties. 
Further, the exploratory tests considering heterogeneity in the rival context yielded some 
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interesting findings that seem counter-intuitive to organizational ecology insights: both 
absolutely and relatively large firms appear to do no better – actually, if anything, worse – than 
small firms in reaping the benefits of a competitor’s merger; the number of competitors in the 
environment (population density) does not appear to significantly affect rival returns; and nearby 
firms appear to – if anything – reap positive benefits from the actions of their competitors. These 
empirical irregularities should be further studied; and if held up, they suggest that the qualities 
which make firms resilient to competitive pressures in an environment also reduce the 
organisation’s ability to reap beneficial opportunities in the same environment. 
Second, Boari et al. (2006) note that studies of rivalry tend to consist of two separate 
approaches: a rational-economic model, or a cognitive-managerial model. While we have made 
some exploratory tests with regard to how rival size, rival proximity, and competition (i.e., 
population density) affect our results, there is no doubt that our analysis can largely be 
characterised as falling in the rational-economic approach. To the degree then that managers 
continue to indicate non-rational behaviour when competitor firms engage in mergers, research 
concerning the cognitive concepts of managerial perceptions could be quite valuable. For 
instance, Vaara (2003) considers post-acquisition integration from a sensemaking perspective 
with the attendant analysis of integration processes and decision-making. Such research clearly 
calls for a more case-based approach – with fine-grained data on managerial perceptions – than 
that employed here.  
Third, while we have taken some initial steps to consider the conditions under which 
non-merging rival firms are more likely to gain from a merger of competitors (i.e., mergers that 
are intra-European, extra-European, and service-industry; and rivals that are similarly-sized, 
small-sized, nearby, and far-away), the question of what drives the abnormal returns of rival 
firms is one that could be more fully addressed. For instance, Oxley et al. (2007) examine the 
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determinants of rival firms’ abnormal returns when competitor firms announce strategic 
alliances; in particular, they find non-horizontal and cross-border alliances to negatively affect 
the abnormal returns of rivals. Further research in this vein regarding M&A activity is certainly 
merited. 
In addition to the future research avenues opened up by the limitations of this study, we 
also hope to spur future research that would employ our implicit approach (focusing on rivals) to 
identifying merger types. The impact of a merger event on both the stock prices of rivals and 
merging firms may allow differentiating between merger types. Mergers that generate net-
positive abnormal returns to merging firms (acquirers and targets) and a positive abnormal return 
to a rival firm could be considered market-power enhancing mergers. While mergers that 
generate a net-negative abnormal return to merging firms (acquirers and targets) and a positive 
abnormal return to a rival firm could be considered non-synergistic mergers. One of the chief 
challenges in management research on M&As has been the inability to hold constant the 
different motives and competitive effects behind merger activity. For instance, Chatterjee (1986) 
excluded horizontal mergers from his study in order to sidestep the issue of collusive synergy 
and focus more on operational synergy. Considering the impact of a merger event on both 
merging and non-merging firms provides a means to begin to differentiate and classify different 
horizontal mergers by their effect on the stock prices of insider and outsider firms. Accordingly, 
the ability to identify merger type can be of practical use in future management studies of M&A 
activity. In short, we in the management literature have neglected Chatterjee’s (1986) early call 
to consider rival effects for far too long. 
Taken as a whole, our evidence strongly rejects the notion that mergers generally 
represent a threat to non-merging firms. It appears that the non-synergistic and market-power 
elements of merger activity (which generate a net-positive return to rival firms) are dominant in 
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our sample of large horizontal mergers. Accordingly, a clear managerial implication of this 
research is that managers should not generally attempt to counter a merger between their 
competitors, as more often than not a merger represents a boon – not a threat – to the underlining 
profitability of rivals. 
 
CONCLUSION  
Motivated by the scarcity of management research on what it means to be a non-merging 
rival firm left outside a merger of competitors, this paper consists of three main endeavours. 
First, employing a sample of large horizontal M&A transactions with expert assessment of rival 
identity and the stock-price event-study methodology, we present empirical evidence in support 
of our contention that rivals generally gain when competitors engage in merger activity. Second, 
we ensure that these positive rival-effects are not simply driven by the information effects 
embedded in merger waves; i.e., ‘future acquisition probability’ does not fundamentally 
determine the abnormal returns of rivals. More precisely, we find the positive abnormal returns 
of rivals to be insensitive to the merger wave. Third, we provide empirical evidence in support of 
the fact that the positive effects for non-merging rival firms are generally robust to heterogeneity 
in merger and rival characteristics. Hence, akin to the well-documented normative prescriptions 
for managers concerning the inadvisability of automatically engaging in acquisition behaviour, it 
is also inadvisable for managers to automatically assume that a competitor’s merger imperils 
rival firms. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Akdogu (2003) describes another interesting case of firms desiring not to be left outside a 
merger: Northwest Airline’s marketing agreement with Continental Airlines gave Northwest 
veto power over any possible acquisitions of Continental (the recent acquisition of Northwest by 
Delta negates this provision, and many pundits note that this suggests that Continental will now 
be in play as a target). See Brito (2003) and Molnar (2007) for many more examples of firms 
taking action to prevent competitors from merging. 
2 See Parvinen and Tikkanen (2007) for a theoretical initiative that encompasses many of these 
merger-failure-explanations under the rubric of ‘incentive asymmetries’. 
3 Merger information is derived from the EC files that are freely downloadable from the EC 
webpage. Our sample includes almost all mergers during the 1990-2002 period that went through 
an in-depth antitrust investigation (the so-called phase II) by the EC, plus, the sample includes a 
randomly matched selection of less problematic (phase I) mergers.
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TABLE I 
Regression Results for Rival Profitability (H1) and Merger Wave (H2) Tests 
 
Regression Specification # 
Regression Model 
(1)  
Baseline 
(2) 
Merger Wave Time-Trend 
Event Window 3-Day CAR 11-Day CAR 3-Day CAR 11-Day CAR 
Target 0.0361 *** 0.0417 *** -0.0053  0.0093  
  (0.0099)  (0.0099)  (0.0109)  (0.0131)  
Acquirer 0.0006  0.0002  0.0000  -0.0000  
  (0.0063)  (0.0063)  (0.0060)  (0.0091)  
Rival 0.0037 ** 0.0090 *** 0.0007  0.0006  
  (0.0037)  (0.0037)  (0.0025)  (0.0048)  
Target-Trend     0.0323 ** 0.0253 ** 
      (0.0126)  (0.0124)  
Acquirer-Trend     0.0005  0.0002  
      (0.0057)  (0.075)  
Rival-Trend     0.0021  0.0059  
      (0.0018)  (0.0042)  
              
Average Effect Target     0.0369 *** 0.0423 *** 
Average Effect Acquirer     0.0006  0.0002  
Average Effect Rival       0.0037 ** 0.0090 ** 
N 853 853 853 853 
R-squared 0.0656 0.0656 0.0994 0.0726 
- The dependent variable is the CAR (3-day & 11-day) for the firm observation.  
- Hubert-White robust standard errors clustered by merger in parentheses.  
- The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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TABLE II 
Regression Results for Merger Heterogeneity (H3) Tests 
 
Regression Specification # 
Regression Model 
(3) 
Geographic Heterogeneity 
(4) 
Product-Market Heterogeneity 
Event Window 3-Day CAR 11-Day CAR 3-Day CAR 11-Day CAR 
Target Intra-European 0.0296 *** 0.0312 ***     
  (0.0110)  (0.0124)      
Target Extra-European 0.0807 *** 0.0883 ***     
  (0.0289)  (0.0289)      
Target Cross-Euro-Border 0.0213 ** 0.0367 **     
  (0.0107)  (0.0169)      
Acquirer Intra-European 0.0051  0.0074      
  (0.0074)  (0.0095)      
Acquirer Extra-European -0.0146  -0.0318 **     
  (0.0110)  (0.0123)      
Acquirer Cross-Euro-Border 0.0013  0.0067      
  (0.0062)  (0.0088)      
Rival Intra-European 0.0034 * 0.0091 *     
  (0.0019)  (0.0048)      
Rival Extra-European 0.0081 ** 0.0075 *     
  (0.0037)  (0.0039)      
Rival Cross-Euro-Border 0.0006  0.0098      
  (0.0045)  (0.0067)      
Target Manufacturing     0.0344 *** 0.0423 *** 
      (0.0105)   (0.0121)   
Target Service     0.0397 ** 0.0404 ** 
      (0.0157)   (0.0172)   
Acquirer Manufacturing     -0.0002   0.0049   
      (0.0069)   (0.0081)   
Acquirer Service     0.0021   0.0027   
      (0.0057)   (0.0098)   
Rival Manufacturing     0.0022   0.0122 **  
      (0.0020)   (0.0049)   
Rival Service     0.0071 *** 0.0169 *** 
        (0.0026)   (0.0041)   
N 853 853 853 853 
R-squared 0.0882 0.0706 0.0669 0.0574 
- The dependent variable is the CAR (3-day & 11-day) for the firm observation.  
- Hubert-White robust standard errors clustered by merger in parentheses.  
- The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
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TABLE III 
Regression Results for Heterogeneity in Rival Size (H4a) Tests 
 
Regression Specification # 
Regression Model 
(5) 
Absolute Rival Size 
(6) 
Relative Rival Size 
Event Window 3-Day CAR 11-Day CAR 3-Day CAR 11-Day CAR 
Target 0.0361 *** 0.0417 *** 0.0347 *** 0.0417 *** 
  (0.0087)  (0.0098)  (0.0092)  (0.0098)  
Acquirer 0.0006  0.0002  0.0006  0.0002  
  (0.0049)  (0.0063)  (0.0049)  (0.0063)  
Large-Rivals 0.0032 * 0.0078 *     
  (0.0020)  (0.0042)      
Small-Rivals 0.0042  0.0104 **     
  (0.0026)  (0.0043)      
Relatively-Small-Rivals     0.0061 ** 0.0120 * 
      (0.0027)  (0.0067)  
Relatively-Similar-Rivals     0.0074 * 0.0147 ** 
      (0.0041)  (0.0061)  
Relatively-Large-Rivals     0.0011  0.0087  
      (0.0021)  (0.0058)  
                
N 853 853 722a 722a 
R-squared 0.0656 0.0656 0.0636 0.0568 
- The dependent variable is the CAR (3-day & 11-day) for the firm observation.  
- Hubert-White robust standard errors clustered by merger in parentheses.  
- The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
- a The number of observations drops due to matching rivals with the corresponding acquiring firm data. 
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TABLE IV 
Regression Results for Heterogeneity in Population Density (H4b) and Proximity (H4c) Tests 
 
Regression Specification # 
Regression Model 
(7) 
Population Density 
(8) 
Proximity 
Event Window 3-Day CAR 11-Day CAR 3-Day CAR 11-Day CAR 
Target 0.0361 *** 0.0417 *** 0.0361 *** 0.0417 *** 
  (0.0087)  (0.0098)  (0.0087)   (0.0098)  
Acquirer 0.0006  0.0002  0.0006   0.0002  
  (0.0049)  (0.0063)  (0.0049)   (0.0063)  
Many-Rivals 0.0036  0.0108 **       
  (0.0023)  (0.0055)        
Few-Rivals 0.0038 * 0.0072        
  (0.0022)  (0.0046)        
Same-Region-Rivals     0.0038 * 0.0074 ** 
      (0.0020)   (0.0035)   
Different-Region-Rivals     0.0050 * 0.0132 ** 
         (0.0026)   (0.0067)   
N 853 853 853 853 
R-squared 0.0656 0.0569 0.0662 0.0569 
- The dependent variable is the CAR (3-day & 11-day) for the firm observation.  
- Hubert-White robust standard errors clustered by merger in parentheses.  
- The symbols *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
- a The number of observations drops due to matching rivals with the corresponding acquiring firm data. 
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APPENDIX A 
Description of Sample Mergers 
 
Notif. Merger No.  Acquirer Target Actual No. of  Industry Merger Type 
Year (Trend)     No. of Rivals 
Rivals 
with Data     
1990 4 Renault Volvo 4 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1990 12 Varta Bosch 3 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1990 24 Mitsubishi Corp. Union Carbide Corp. 2 2 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1990 42 Alcatel Fiat 2 2 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1990 43 Fiat Alcatel 1 1 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1990 50 At&T Ncr Corporation 5 4 Manufacturing Extra-European 
1991 53 Boeing Alenia 3 2 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1991 57 Digital Equipment Int. Mannesmann 2 2 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1991 68 Tetrapak 1 Alfa-Laval 2 1 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1991 81 Viag Continental Can 9 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1991 121 Ingersoll Rand Co. Dresser Inc. 5 3 Manufacturing Extra-European 
1991 126 Accor Wagons-Lits 6 3 Service Intra-European 
1991 129 Digital Equipment Corp. Philips Electronics 7 6 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1991 141 Uap Transatlantic HDG. 2 2 Service Intra-European 
1991 165 Alcatel Cable S.A. Aeg Kabel 4 2 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1992 184 Gran Metropolitan Cinzano S.A. 1 1 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1992 190 Nestle' Eaux Vittel 2 1 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1992 214 Du Pont Imperial Chemical Ind. 3 3 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1992 221 Asea Brown Boveri  Trafalgar Hse 6 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1992 222 Mannesmann Hoesch 1 1 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1992 236 Ericsson Ascom 6 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1992 253 Btr Pirelli 5 2 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1993 269 Shell Montedison 14 7 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1993 286 Zuerich Insurance  Municipal Mutual Ins. 3 2 Service Intra-European 
1993 291 Knp  Buehrmann Tetterode 2 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1993 315 Mannesmann Vlourec  Dalmine 3 1 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1993 331 Fletcher Challenge Methanex 6 3 Manufacturing Extra-European 
1993 354 Cyanamid Shell 6 5 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1993 358 Pilkington Societa' Italiana Vetro 4 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1994 430 Procter & Gamble Vp Schickedanz 4 2 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1994 437 Matra Marconi Space  British Aerospace  16 6 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1994 447 Schneider Electric S.A. AEG A.G. 6 5 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1994 466 Tractebel Synatom 1 0 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1994 468 Siemens Italtel 5 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1994 469 Bertelsmann Deutsche Bundespost 2 1 Service Intra-European 
1994 477 Daimler Benz Kässbohrer 6 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1994 479 Man Ingersoll Rand 4 1 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1994 484 Thyssen Stahl Acciai Speciali Asti  5 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1994 498 Commercial Union Suez 5 3 Service Intra-European 
1994 508 CCF BHF 12 7 Service Intra-European 
1995 550 Union Carbide  Enichem S.P.A. 14 8 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1995 582 Orkla As Volvo 4 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1995 603 Crown Cork & Seal  Carnaudmetalbox Sa 4 2 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1995 619 Gencor Lonmin 2 1 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1995 623 Kimberly-Clark Scott Paper 6 2 Manufacturing Extra-European 
1995 632 Rhône Poulenc Rorer  Fisons Plc.) 12 5 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1996 685 Siemens Lagardere 7 6 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1996 689 Singapore Telecom Belgacom 4 2 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1996 706 Alcatel Aeg 5 3 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1996 731 Kvaerner A.S. Trafalgar House Plc 3 1 Service Intra-European 
1996 737 Ciba-Geigy Sandoz 26 12 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1996 754 Anglo American Corp. Lonmin 2 1 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
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Year Merger No.  Acquirer Target Actual No. of  Industry Merger Type 
Notif. (Trend)     No. of Rivals 
Rivals 
with Data     
1996 774 Saint Gobain Hoechst Wacker 2 1 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1996 794 Coca-Cola Enterprises Cadbury Schweppes 5 2 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1996 798 General Electric Compunet Computer 5 2 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1996 818 Cardo Thyssen 6 6 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1997 833 Coca Cola Company Carslberg A/S 2 2 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1997 850 Fortis Abn-Amro Bank 2 2 Service Intra-European 
1997 856 British Telecom Mci (Ii) 5 4 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1997 877 Boeing Mcdonnell Douglas 1 1 Manufacturing Extra-European 
1997 913 Siemens Elektrowatt 12 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1997 938 Guinness Grand Metropolitan 4 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1997 942 Veba Degusta 15 7 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1997 950 Roche Boehringer Mannheim  5 5 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1997 954 Bain Capital Inc. Hoechst Ag 8 5 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1997 967 Klm Air UK 2 1 Service Intra-European 
1997 970 Thyssen Krupp Stahl Itw Signode 12 2 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1997 986 Bayer Group Du Pont I De  Nemours 5 3 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1997 993 Bertelsmann Taurus Entertainment  1 1 Service Intra-European 
1997 1027 Deutsche Telekom Bertelsmann 1 1 Service Intra-European 
1997 1042 Eastman Kodak  Dainippon Ink  3 3 Manufacturing Extra-European 
1997 1069 Worldcom Mci 2 2 Service Extra-European 
1997 1081 Dow Jones General Electric 1 0 Service Extra-European 
1997 1094 Caterpillar Lucas Varity 7 7 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1998 1142 Commercial Union Plc General Accident Plc 8 4 Service Intra-European 
1998 1221 Rewe Meinl 4 1 Service Intra-European 
1998 1225 Enso Oyj Stora  6 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1998 1232 Ingram Tech Data 4 2 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1998 1252 At&T TCI 4 3 Service Extra-European 
1998 1258 General Electric Finmeccanica 3 2 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1998 1265 Chs Electronics Inc. Metro Ag 4 2 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1998 1332 Thomson-CSF Lucas Varity Plc 4 1 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1999 1363 Du Pont De Nemours  Hoechst AG 4 4 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1999 1383 Exxon Corporation Mobil Corporation 34 11 Service Extra-European 
1999 1403 Astra Zeneca 13 6 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1999 1405 Tnt Post Group N.V. Jet Services Sa 7 2 Service Intra-European 
1999 1439 Telia AB Telenor 6 2 Service Intra-European 
1999 1476 Adecco S.A. Delphi 2 2 Service Intra-European 
1999 1484 ALSTOM ABB  13 6 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1999 1524 Airtours First Choice 6 1 Service Intra-European 
1999 1532 Bp Amoco Plc. Atlantic Richfield  11 5 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1999 1539 CVC European Equity II Groupe DANONE  6 2 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1999 1551 AT&T Corp. MediaOne Group 1 1 Service Extra-European 
1999 1561 Getronics N.V. Wang Laboratories  3 2 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1999 1578 Sanitec Konink. Sphinx 27 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1999 1596 ACCOR  S.A. The BLACKSTONE  4 2 Service Intra-European 
1999 1628 Total Fina Elf Aquitaine 15 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1999 1630 L'Air Liquide S.A. The BOC Group plc. 7 3 Service Intra-European 
1999 1636 Matra Marconi Space Astrium 15 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1999 1641 Linde AG AGA AB 5 5 Service Intra-European 
1999 1650 ACEA S.P.A. Telefonica 1 1 Service Intra-European 
1999 1663 Alcan Aluminium Ltd. Alusuisse - Lonza   13 4 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1999 1671 Dow Chemical Union Carbide 12 5 Manufacturing Extra-European 
1999 1672 Ab Volvo Scania Ab 5 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
1999 1673 Veba Ag Viag Ag 16 9 Service Intra-European 
1999 1682 Ashland Superfos 1 4 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
1999 1687 Adecco SA Olsten 3 3 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
1999 1693 Alcoa Inc. Reynolds Metals  18 5 Manufacturing Extra-European 
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Year Merger No.  Acquirer Target Actual No. of  Industry Merger Type 
Notif. (Trend)     No. of Rivals 
Rivals 
with Data     
1999 1694 Emc Data General 4 1 Manufacturing Extra-European 
1999 1741 MCI WorldCom Sprint 25 12 Service Extra-European 
1999 1789 INA Holding  LuK Group 11 5 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2000 1797 Bae Systems+ Investor  Celsius AB 12 3 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2000 1806 Novartis AG AstraZeneca Plc. 18 6 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2000 1813 Industri Kapital (Nordkem) Dyno 18 5 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2000 1845 AOL Time Warner 13 5 Service Extra-European 
2000 1853 Electricite De France EnBW 8 4 Service Intra-European 
2000 1879 The Boeing Company Hughes Electronics  13 2 Manufacturing Extra-European 
2000 1882 Pirelli Cavi e Sistemi  BICC General 24 6 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2000 1892 Sara Lee Courtaulds Textiles  1 3 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
2000 1915 The Post Office TPG 11 1 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
2000 1940 Framatome Siemens 24 7 Service Intra-European 
2000 1956 Ford Motor Company Autonova AB 4 5 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
2000 1982 Telia AB Oracle Corporation 3 2 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
2000 1990 Unilever PLC  Bestfood 29 5 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
2000 2020 Metsä-Serla Corporation Modo 9 5 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2000 2033 Svedala Industri AB Metso Corporation 1 1 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2000 2041 United Airlines  US Airways Group Inc. 4 3 Service Extra-European 
2000 2050 Vivendi S.A. Canal+ S.A. 4 4 Service Intra-European 
2000 2059 Siemens AG Dematic 22 10 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2000 2060 Robert Bosch GmbH Mannesmann Rexroth 11 5 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2000 2097 SCA Mölnlycke Holding  Metsä Tissue Corp. 7 2 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2000 2139 Bombardier Adtranz 11 3 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
2001 2201 Man Auwaerter 5 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2202 Stinnes AG (E.ON AG) Holland Chemical 5 2 Service Intra-European 
2001 2220 General Electric Corp. Honeywell    22 13 Manufacturing Extra-European 
2001 2283 Schneider Legrand 4 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2302 H.J. Heinz Company CSM NV 14 3 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
2001 2333 Riverbank Sofidiv UK Ltd. 3 1 Service Intra-European 
2001 2389 Deutsche Shell GmbH RWE AG 16 7 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2396 Industri Kapital (Nordkem) Perstorp 14 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2416 Tetra Laval, S.A. Sidel, S.A. 14 5 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2420 Mitsui CVRD 3 3 Service Extra-European 
2001 2421 UMG-Beteiligungs-GmbH Temic Telefunken  15 11 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2447 Fabricom GTI 3 2 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2485 Verbund Estag 9 2 Service Intra-European 
2001 2498 UPM-Kymmene Haindl 17 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2499 Norske Skog Parenco 17 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2504 Cadbury  Schweppes   Pernod 9 6 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2510 Cendant Corporation Galileo International 2 2 Service Extra-European 
2001 2513 RWE Kaertner Energie  4 3 Service Intra-European 
2001 2530 Südzucker Saint Louis 5 2 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2533 British Petrol plc (BP) Veba Oil GmbH 17 8 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2577 GE Capital Corporation Heller Financial, Inc 11 7 Service Extra-European 
2001 2598 TDC Mobile International  CMG  5 5 Service Intra-European 
2001 2602 Gerling-Konzern  NCM 6 3 Service Intra-European 
2001 2608 INA Holding Schaeffler  FAG  5 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2001 2629 Flextronics International Xerox Corporation 5 4 Manufacturing Extra-European 
2001 2659 Fortum Oyj Birka Energi AB 10 4 Service Intra-European 
2001 2679 Electricité de France TXU EUROPE 3 2 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
2002 2693 ADM Alfred C. 1 1 Service Cross-Euro-Border 
2002 2705 EnerSys Energy Storage 5 3 Manufacturing Cross-Euro-Border 
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Year Merger No.  Acquirer Target Actual No. of  Industry Merger Type 
Notif. (Trend)     No. of Rivals 
Rivals 
with Data     
2002 2726 Koninklijke KPN N.V. E-Plus 3 2 Service Intra-European 
2002 2738 General Electric Company Unison Industries Inc. 7 3 Manufacturing Extra-European 
2002 2796 Siemens AG Aerolas GmbH 5 4 Manufacturing Intra-European 
2002 2804 Vendex KBB Nederland  Brico Belgium S.A. 7 1 Service Intra-European 
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